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L ast term, in Graham v Florida,
1 the United States Supreme 
Court found unconstitutional the sentence of life without pa-
role for a juvenile who committed a non-homicide offense. 
This attention to the sentencing of juvenile offenders is a con-
tinuation of the Court’s decision in Roper v Simmons,2 in which 
the Court held that juvenile offenders could not constitutionally 
receive the death penalty.
This scrutiny should be a signal to Michigan to examine its 
own jurisprudence on juveniles receiving sentences of life without 
parole. Michigan has the second-highest number of persons serv-
ing sentences of life without parole for offenses committed when 
they were 17 years old or younger.3 Michigan’s constitution, arti-
cle 1, §16, provides broader protection than the federal constitution 
under its analogous ban on “cruel or unusual punishment.” Fur-
ther, the confl uence of several, separately passed, statutes means 
that, in many cases, juveniles sentenced to life without parole in 
Michigan will never have a judge assess anything about their indi-
vidual culpability, maturity, or relative role in the offense.
Graham v Florida
In Graham, the Court held that the sentence of life without 
parole for a non-homicide offense committed by a juvenile vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment. Graham, the 16-year-old defendant, 
was convicted of armed burglary with assault or battery—a fi rst-
degree life felony—and attempted armed robbery and placed on 
probation.4 Then, when he violated his probation by committing 
an armed robbery, he was given a sentence of life without pa-
role.5 The Supreme Court determined that “objective indicia of 
society’s standards as expressed in legislative enactments and sen-
tencing practice,” as well as the Court’s independent judgment 
about the culpability of these juvenile offenders, the severity of 
the punishment, and the lack of penological justifi cation, led to 
the conclusion that, as a categorical matter, persons who commit-
ted a non-homicide offense at age 17 or younger could not be con-
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stitutionally sentenced to life without parole.6 The Court’s analysis 
of the culpability of juvenile offenders, in particular, relied heav-
ily on Roper v Simmons.
Roper v Simmons
In Roper, the Court noted that “evolving standards of decency” 
showed a growing con sensus in the states against imposition of 
the death penalty for crimes committed by minors.7 Additionally, 
the Court concluded that three signifi cant differences between 
adults and those under 18 mean that juveniles “cannot with reli-
ability be classifi ed among the worst offenders.”8 First, juveniles 
lack maturity and have an underdeveloped sense of responsi-
bility, which leads them to make hasty and poorly thought-out 
decisions.9 Juveniles are also “more vulnerable or susceptible to 
negative infl uences and outside pressures, including peer pres-
sure,” in part because of their lack of control over their environ-
ment.10 Third, the character of juveniles is less fi xed and not as 
well formed.11 Considering these differences, the Roper Court also 
concluded that the retributive and deterrent purposes of punish-
ment are not well served by the death penalty for minors and 
that the sentence is disproportionate. The Court also took note of 
the isolation of the United States on the world stage as the only 
country that continued to give “offi cial sanction” to the juvenile 
death penalty.12
The Michigan Constitution’s Prohibition 
of Cruel or Unusual Punishment
Michigan’s constitution prohibits “cruel or unusual” punish-
ment,13 instead of the “cruel and unusual” punishment ban con-
tained in the Eighth Amendment.14 The Michigan Constitution pro-
vides broader protections against punishment than the Eighth 
Amendment because of the difference in the text of the provi-
sions, the history of the Michigan Constitution, and the relevant 




does not advance other purposes of punishment more signifi -
cantly than a lengthy, but parolable, sentence.27
Direct-File Cases: A “Perfect Storm” 
of Unconstitutional Dimensions
Particularly subject to attack are LWOP sentences that are auto-
matically imposed on juveniles without the ability of a judge to 
ever consider the child’s maturity or age, potential for rehabilita-
tion, role in the offense, or other factors. Three separate statutes 
interact to create this (now possibly unconstitutional)28 sentence. 
First, juveniles as young as 14 years old charged with fi rst-degree 
murder and a number of other crimes can be automatically tried 
as adults in circuit court rather than adjudicated in the family di-
vision of circuit court.29 Second, in 1996, the legislature required 
that juveniles tried as adults in circuit court be sentenced the 
same as an adult for the most serious crimes, instead of allowing 
the judge to determine whether to sentence as an adult or a juve-
nile, as under prior law.30 Finally, the sentence for fi rst-degree 
murder (including felony-murder) is mandatory life without pa-
role.31 This “perfect storm” of statutes results in many juveniles 
accused of serious crimes being tried as adults in circuit court 
and those charged with fi rst-degree murder automatically receiv-
ing sentences of life without the possibility of parole. Therefore, 
the most sympathetic 15-year-old accomplice to a felony-murder 
and the most sociopathic adult serial killer will receive the same 
sentence, without any judicial ability to take stock of the differ-
ence between the two for sentencing purposes. This complete 
inability of a court to consider the gravity of the offense, includ-
ing the culpability of the offender, results in disproportionately 
cruel LWOP sentences.
The lack of court discretion available in juvenile sentencing 
also renders the sentences imposed in Michigan truly unusual. A 
handful of states ban juvenile LWOP sentences, and the vast ma-
jority of states give judicial discretion with respect to transferring 
teens to adult court or in sentencing them in fi rst-degree mur-
der cases. Michigan is among a shrinking minority of states that 
allow LWOP sentences but have no judicial discretion in transfers 
to adult court or sentencing.32 Further, two states’ courts have rec-
ognized problems with juvenile LWOP sentences: in California 
and Illinois, courts have held that, in specifi c cases, it would vio-
late their respective state constitutions to impose juvenile LWOP 
sentences.33 The Illinois Supreme Court specifi cally highlighted 
the fact that the mandatory transfer and sentencing scheme would 
be responsible for imposing an unconstitutional punishment given 
the mitigating factors that should be considered in the case.34
Meanwhile, Colorado, which previously established prosecutorial 
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When examining whether a sentence is cruel or unusual, a 
court must weigh the gravity of the offense against the severity 
of the penalty, taking into account relevant facts about the of-
fender’s culpability.16 The court must also compare sentences im-
posed on other offenders in the same jurisdiction and sentences 
imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.17 Finally, the 
court must examine whether the punishment achieves its goal, 
with a particular focus on rehabilitation, a goal of punishment 
that is “rooted in Michigan’s legal traditions.”18
Life Without Parole for Juveniles
Given the United States Supreme Court’s cases, the survival of 
sentences of life without parole (LWOP sentences) for juveniles 
in Michigan looks much less certain. First, examination of the 
gravity of the offense, including the offender’s culpability, must 
now take into account Graham’s and Roper’s clear statements 
about the lesser culpability of juveniles, as compared to adults 
who commit similar offenses.19 Other facts about 
offender culpability, either individually or as a 
group, may also shift this calculation.
Consideration of LWOP sentences within 
Michi gan shows that juveniles who receive the 
sentence are being treated disproportionately. 
Life without parole is the most serious sentence 
that a Michigan offender can receive.20 Less cul-
pable adolescents are therefore being sentenced 
on par with adult criminals who behaved in a 
manner that should be treated more severely.21 Additionally, in 
Michigan, a large percentage of juveniles sentenced to life with-
out parole committed felony-murder or were convicted under an 
aiding-and-abetting theory,22 further widening the disparity. A 
comparison with other jurisdictions also shows that LWOP sen-
tences are imposed at a higher rate on Michigan’s juveniles.23
Finally, life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile com-
pletely eliminates any opportunity for rehabilitation.24 This goal 
of punishment—rehabilitation—is crucially important when ex-
amining an extreme sentence given to children because “the char-
acter of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.”25 A 
sentence of life without parole ignores the reality that most youth 
“age out” of criminal behavior.26 Moreover, a total ban on parole 
The most sympathetic 15-year-old accomplice to a 
felony-murder and the most sociopathic adult serial 
killer will receive the same sentence, without any 
judicial ability to take stock of the difference between 
the two for sentencing purposes.
FAST FACTS
Nationally, Michigan has the second-highest number of 
people serving life without parole for crimes committed 
when they were under age 18.
The United States Supreme Court’s opinions in Graham v 
Florida, banning juvenile life without parole for non-homicide 
crimes, and in Roper v Simmons, banning the juvenile death 
penalty, have increased scrutiny of sentences of life without 
parole for juveniles.
Michigan’s constitutional ban on cruel or unusual punishment 
is interpreted more broadly than the federal constitution.
discretion in charging juveniles in adult court and severe limits 
on the exercise of sentencing discretion in the same way that 
Michigan does, banned the use of juvenile LWOP sentences alto-
gether.35 Michigan’s complete denial of any individualized con-
sideration of the youth by the court in either trying adolescents 
as adults or mandatorily imposing life sentences without the pos-
sibility of parole makes it an outlier among the states.
Prior Michigan Cases on Juvenile LWOP Sentences
The Michigan Supreme Court has never addressed the consti-
tutionality of juvenile LWOP sentences. The one published Michi-
gan Court of Appeals opinion was issued before the United States 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Graham and Roper and was based 
on the prior juvenile transfer system, in which a judicial determi-
nation was made about whether the child should be sentenced 
as an adult.36 In fact, the Court of Appeals concluded that this 
determination was integral to its analysis of the required factors 
and its fi nding of constitutionality. The Court stated: “The fourth 
factor, the need for rehabilitation, is taken into consideration by 
Michigan courts when they determine whether juvenile defen-
dants should be sentenced as adults rather than as juveniles.”37 No 
appellate court case has considered the shifting landscape brought 
about by the change in Michi gan’s juvenile waiver statutes and the 
United States Supreme Court’s Graham and Roper opinions.
Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Roper set off a 
wave of scrutiny of sentences of life without parole imposed for 
crimes committed by minors. Last term in Graham, the Court in-
creased the pressure by fi nding an LWOP sentence unconstitu-
tional for any juvenile who committed a non-homicide offense. 
In Michigan, this scrutiny, combined with the history and lan-
guage of the Michigan Constitution and the unusual elimination 
of any discretion by the trial court, may result in a fi nding that a 
life sentence without parole for a juvenile is, at least in some 
cases, unconstitutional. ■
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